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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900375-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DELL D. ARCHULETA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order revoking defendant's
probation for convictions of theft, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), and theft by
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-405 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990),
as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly revoke defendant's
probation?

A trial judge's order revoking probation will be

upheld absent an abuse of discretion.
Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah October 22, 1990).

State v. Jameson, 146 Utah

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1990), and one count of theft by deception, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of 76-6-405 (1990) (Record [hereafter
R.] at 6). Trial by jury was held on September 18, 1989, in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Pat B. Brian, district judge, presiding (R. at 36). Defendant
was convicted of both counts (R. at 25-6).

On October 6, 1989,

defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years, and ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of $10,000.00 and restitution in the
amount of $77.00 (October 6, 1989 Sentencing Transcript
[hereafter S.T.] at 5 and R. at 73). Both the sentence and fine
were stayed and defendant was placed on probation for 18 months
on the following conditions (S.T. at 5):
1. Usual and ordinary conditions required by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
2. Serve 90 days in the Salt Lake County
Jail. The court will give the defendant
credit for time served, and deem the 90 days
to have been served as of October 6, 1989.
3. Pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 at
the rate of $100.00 per month starting
January 1, 1990.
4. Pay restitution in the amount of $77.00
in full by June 1, 1990.

5. Obtain employment by October 16, 1989 and
maintain full-time employment (40 hours per
week).
6.

Commit no crimes.

7. Must pay child support in the amount of
$75.00 per month starting November 1, 1989.
All child support arrearages must be paid
within 18 months at a rate of $225.00 per
month. Total child support payments are
$300.00 per month. One-half to be paid at
the first of the month and the other half to
be paid on the fifteenth of the month.
8. Evaluated by APPD for drug or alcohol
abuse and if needed, enter any program deemed
appropriate by APPD.
(S.T. at 5-7 and R. at 74 and included as Addendum A ) .
On May 22, 1990, the court issued an order to show
cause based on allegations that defendant had violated the terms
and conditions of his probation.

At the order to show cause

hearing, the court made the following findings:
1. The defendant failed to report to Adult
Probation and Parole in May, 1990.
2. The defendant failed to maintain
verifiable, lawful employment and/or
education.
3. The defendant failed to pay $100.00 per
month towards his fine.
4. The defendant failed to pay a total of
$300.00 per month towards his child support
obligation.
(Order to Show Cause Hearing [hereafter H.T.] at 31-32 and R. at
95-96 and included as Addendum B).

Based on these findings, the

court revoked defendant's probation and reinstated probation for
eighteen months after his release from jail

upon the following

Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on August
17, 1990.
-3-

conditions:
1. That all conditions of probation
previously imposed be in effect.
2. That he serve six months in jail with
credit for time served.
3. That within fifteen calendar days from
his release from jail, he be employed sixty
hours per week, and that he provide written
verification of the same.
4. That he be enrolled in vocational
training as soon as possible after his
release from jail, but no later than ninety
days from that release; further that any
costs he pays towards said vocational
training can be deducted from the fine
previously imposed.
(R. at 96; Addendum B).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the
statement of the case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly revoked defendant's probation
because the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
failed to report to his probation supervisor by May 5, 1990; that
defendant failed to maintain full-time employment; and that
defendant failed to pay the fines, restitution and child support
as ordered by the court.
Defendant did not keep faith with the court or the
agency which supervised his probation.

He therefore willfully

violated the conditions of his probation.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVOKED DEFENDANT'S
PROBATION.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in revoking
his probation.

He claims that he did not willfully violate his

probation and alleges that he in fact made good faith efforts to
abide by the conditions of his probation (Brief of Appellant
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 8-10).

The record however does not

support defendant's good faith claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (Supp. 1990) states:
After the hearing the court shall make
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the
defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation
revoked, modified, continued, or that the
entire probation term commence anew. If
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed
shall be executed.
At the order to show cause hearing on June 20, 1990, the trial
court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt four
of the five violations alleged in the affidavit in support of
order to show cause (H.T. at 31-32 and R. at 80-81).

As a result

of these findings, the trial court revoked defendant's probation.
However, rather than reinstating defendant's original sentence of
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, at the Utah
State Prison, the trial court granted 18 months probation and a
six-month jail sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail.
In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:

-5-

[W]e reaffirm that judges may exercise
sentencing discretion within those limits
established by the legislature; the power to
fix sentencing limits and the power to
suspend sentence in favor of probation are
not inherent in the judiciary but must be
authorized by statute. Similarly, the power
to revoke probation must be exercised within
legislatively established limits.
757 P.2d at 464.

Because nothing in the record shows that

defendant "[kept] faith with the court and the agency which
supervise[d] his probation,M State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah
1944)), the trial court correctly revoked defendant's probation.
The trial court's actions were clearly within the legislatively
established limits of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (Supp. 1990)
and the order revoking probation should be upheld by this Court.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981), the
Utah Supreme Court observed that "the decision of a trial court
to modify or revoke probation is basically a discretionary
matter."

This was reaffirmed in State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv.

Rep. 3 (Utah October 22, 1990).

Earlier, in Williams v. Harris,

149 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1944), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
the State's burden required a showing of "some competent
evidence."

Similarly, several jurisdictions have observed that

the standard of proof required for revocation of probation is
that the evidence and facts reasonably satisfy the judge that the
probationer's conduct has not been as required by the conditions
of probation.

See United States v. Guadarrama, 742 F.2d 487 (9th

Cir. 1984); United States v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.
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1982); United States v, Young

, dth Cir. 1985i ,

Other courts have held that "

[trial] court requires 2it« !•
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"

••

H o w e v e r , i n S t a t e v> Hodgeb
•

Ap'
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this C o u r t h e l d that "the s t a n d a r u

condition
2
preponderance of the evidence."

uLan

, ..«= ?ed in

* probatior

guidance ir meeting the standard:
Under the preponderance of evidence standard,
the court needs only to balance the evidence,
using discretion to weigh its importance and
credibility, and decide whether the
probationer has more likely than not violated
the conditions of probation*
798 '.za at
Whe
s t a n d a r d o:
Sr-

dence -& ihe appropriate
/-

• ..•

*-t. .•

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt

violations alleged in t

A.-

u s - \ ^und thai uie

to«r rf t ^

fivf

or order to show

o
Because the panel of this Court in Hodges effectively overr111ed
the "some competent evidence" standard adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Williams, something the Utah Court of Appeals
does not appear to have the authority to do, the State has filed
a petition for writ of certiorari in that case in the Utah
Supreme Court. However, for purposes of this appeal, the State
will address defendant's claim under the Hodges preponderance
standard. The State, nevertheless, maintains that this Court is
bound to follow the Supreme Court's "some competent evidence"
standard until the Supreme Court sees fit to abandon it. Indeed,
this panel is not obligated to follow Hodges on this point, in
that Hodges is in direct conflict with Williams; this Court could
review defendant's probation revocation under the "some competent
evidence" standard.
-7-

cause (H.T. at 31-32 and R. at 80-81).

Because "beyond a

reasonable doubt" is a higher standard than "preponderance of
evidence", it is logical to conclude that the evidence presented
at the revocation hearing established by at least a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant violated the terms of his
probation.

Indeed, the record supports that conclusion.

Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking defendant's probation.
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT KEEP FAITH WITH THE
COURT AND THE AGENCY WHICH SUPERVISED HIS
PROBATION AND THEREFORE WILLFULLY VIOLATED
THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION.
As part of his probation requirements, defendant was to
report to his probation officer by the fifth of each month and
fill out a monthly report (H.T. at 7). Defendant took no
affirmative steps to meet this requirement.

Only through the

efforts of three different probation officers to contact
defendant and remind him of his obligation were any reports filed
(H.T. at 4-7). Such spoon feeding was not contemplated by the
court when it granted the privilege of probation.

Simply because

defendant's probation officers succeeded on a few occasions to
get defendant to file his monthly report does not mean that they
now bear the burden and consequences of defendant's failure to
comply with his probation requirements.

Thus, defendant's

analogy to contract law has no place in this proceeding (Br. of
App. at 10-15).

The court ordered that defendant comply with the

usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole (R. at 74). One of these ordinary
conditions requires defendant to report to his supervising agent

-8-

person -
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month.

Defendant consistently
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Karl Bartell
days 1

req
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-

••*•* ion and Parole by
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May 5, *??>.
in alleging

> - probation r e q u i r e m e n t s ,

complying v.•r

--: - **
** -•-

,

*--

:

Bartell w a s justified

defendant had violated the

condlt ,
Defendant claims he was serious about being employed
' -: p. at ±v)

'''-~;*' , defendant failed to maintain full-time

employment as requirec .

I>I ihc imlt.T in i hnv rnuse

hearing the trial court stated:
The court finds that the State has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt allegation N o . 3 in
the a f f i d a v i t , in that the defendant violated
previously granted probation by having failed
to m a i n t a i n v e r i f i a b l e , lawful employment.
This Court w i l l take judicial notice that
from South Temple to 5300 South on State
S t r e e t , on any given day, there are probably
15 or 20 help wanted signs posted in 1iving
color in the windows of business
establishments. Employment in this community
can b e h a d , if a person is serious about
being employed. Compensation m a y not be m o r e
than m i n i m u m w a g e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it i s there
for a person serious about being employed
r

VH

cow . •

is apparent from this finding that the trial
. ed '

I,na employment.

• I IP f PIU la ii 1 lie in n i IIIHHH1 reasonable effort

;n Bearden v. G e o r g i a , 11 J U.S. 658 (198: *

the United States Supreme Court stated:
[A] probationer's failure to m a k e sufficient
bona fide efforts to seek employment . . . in
order to pay the fine or restitution m a y
reflect an insufficient concern for paying
the debt he owes to society for his crime.
In sue*
situatior v :e State "s "likewise

justified in revoking probation and using
imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for
the offense,
461 U.S. at 668.
The record reflects that defendant had brief full-time
employment, which he quit, and worked part-time through a
temporary service (H.T. at 15, 18)
order of the court.

This did not comply with the

The probation conditions required defendant

to work 40 hours a week (R. at 74). Further, the trial judge
informed defendant that he may need to obtain a second or third
job in order to pay his debts and comply with his probation
requirements (S.T. at 7). Because defendant failed to maintain a
full time job, the court was justified in finding that he was in
violation of his probation agreement.
Defendant also claims the court erred in its decision
to revoke his probation for financial noncompliance (Br. of App.
at 23). Again in Bearden, the United States Supreme Court held:
A sentencing court cannot properly revoke a
defendant's probation for failure to pay a
fine and make restitution, absent evidence
and findings that he was somehow responsible
for the failure or that alternative forms of
punishment were inadequate to meet the
State's interest in punishment and
deterrence.
Id. at 660. At the same time, however, the Bearden Court
recognized that "[a] defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him
from punishment."

I_d. at 669.

The circumstances in this case differ significantly
from those in Bearden.

The Bearden Court, unlike the trial court

in the case at bar, made no finding that the defendant had not
made sufficient bona fide efforts to find work.
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Id, at 673
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Defendant claims that he made $20.00 payments to his daughter-s
mother and that these payments were no different than indirect
payments submitted to the Di vl sion of Recovery Services (Br. of
A p p . at 1 9 - 2 0 ) . A t the sentencing hearing, the court addressed
this issue, stating: "You [defendant] obtain a statement in the
form of an affidavit from your ex-wife, 1 .hat that money has been
received in the form of child support, how much, over what period
of t i m e , and the Court will reconsider the total amount of
arrearages in light of any documentation you submit, showing
payment of child support" (S.T. at 8 ) . The record contains no
such documentation, nor does it indicate that defendant attempted
to provide the documentation.

Defendant never denies that he violated his probation
agreement.

He only argues that the violations were not willful.

Further, although defendant claims that the trial court erred in
not informing him that it would accept token payments, he never
asserts that he did not understand what was required of him on
probation.

In fact, the opposite is true.

The court questioned

defendant about his understanding:
Q. You went into the probation department
after you were placed on probation by this
Court, and signed the probation agreement
dated October 19, 1989, did you not?
A.

Yes.

Q. There was really no question in your mind
as to what your—what you were to do in the
nine months that passed since that date, was
there?
A. No, I knew exactly what I was supposed to
do, required to do.
(H.T. at 26).
Defendant understood what was required of him on
probation.

Yet, he willfully violated the conditions of his

probation by failing to report by the 5th of each month, failing
to maintain full-time employment and failing to pay the fines,
restitution and child support ordered by the court.

As a result,

the trial court properly revoked defendant's probation.
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CONCLUSION
Based c

-•- foregoing, the State respectfully requests

that this Cc

the tr. INI ». our I "" « decision to revoke

defendant's probation.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

H

day

r December,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney Gen*
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

we would do is be back here on an order to show cause.

If he

2

did pay the fine, it would be taking money from that potential

3

source.

4

than just reduce that as a penalty altogether, to give him

5

some additional community service in lieu of that.

I would ask the Court to reduce the fine, but, rather

6

THE COURT:

Anything further?

7

MS. REMAL:

Nothing further, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Is there any legal reason why sentence

9

should not be imposed?

10

MS. REMAL:

None that I know of.

11

THE COURT:

The defendant has heretofore been

12

convicted of theft, a second-degree felony.

13

the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the

14

term prescribed by law, a fine of $10,000 is imposed.

15

imposition of that sentence is suspended.

16

placed on probation for 18 months on the following terms and

17

conditions:

18

County Jail.

19

time served, and deem the 90 days to have been served as of

20

October 6, 1989.

21

For that offense,

The

The defendant is

One, the defendant serve 90 days in the Salt Lake
The Court will give the defendant credit for

The Court imposes a fine of $1,000 plus the

22

surcharge.

That fine is to be paid at $100 a month on the

23

first day of each month, and the first payment is to commence

24

January 1, 1989 —

25

increments thereafter on the first day of each month until the

1990. And the fine is to be paid in $100

1

fine and the surcharge have been paid.

2

impose community service.

3
4

The Court will not

The defendant is ordered to pay restitution.

That

amount is to be paid in full on or before June 1, 1990.

5

The Court orders that the defendant be evaluated for

6

drug and alcohol abuse, and if treatment is deemed appropriate

7

by the probation department, that the defendant enter into and

8

complete any program recommended by Adult Probation and

9

Parole.

10

The defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain

11

full-time employment, with a minimum of 40 hours of work each

12

week for the entire time the defendant is on probation.

13

Employment is to commence no later than October 9, 1989.

14

The defendant is further ordered, as a condition of

15

probation, to pay child support as ordered in previous court

16

orders; that is, to pay $75 per month in child support.

17

current child support payment is to commence on November 1,

18

1989, and be paid on the first day of each month thereafter,

19

with regularity.

20

The

The Court further orders that the arrearages, in the

21

amount of $3,900, be paid in full in the next 18 months.

22

Those payments are to be made at $225 a month in arrearages.

23

The $75 a month current child support, for a total payment of

24

$300 per month in child support.

25

made on the 1st day of each month, and half on the 15th day of

Half that payment is to be

each month.

And the Court insists that that term and

condition of probation be complied with.
The recoupment fee is not ordered.
The defendant is ordered to be law-abiding.
The defendant needs to understand that should you
come before this Court on a willful violation of any order
that represents a term or condition of your probation, you
will go back to jail.

Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
job.

Yes, I do.

You may be required to obtain a second

You may be required to obtain a third job.

get with it.

You better

The Court expects that child support and

arrearages to be paid in full, your current child support to
be maintained, the fine to be paid, and the restitution to be
paid.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

May I say something?

You may.

THE DEFENDANT:

I have been paying my child support

to my ex-girlfriend, my daughter's mother, and she was on
welfare, and I didn't know about it.
why it is backed up so far.

That's the only reason

They got ahold of me through my

sister, and told me all this back money, when all this time I
had been paying it.
THE COURT:

If you have any verification that child

support has been paid, which would legally offset the
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CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
EfUsual andjordinanAConditions required by.the Dept. of Adult Probation & Paroley

,•^0

9h Dais)-

mj/b-L

l^ibrrr*

Jioyf^

•

in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
-77? Uf< l?Jf/?rtr/i -ffPrrnlVfin *
| / p a y a fine in the amount of %UW- D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or pfit the rate of IM1 & tHfTlih &TQ rtl M *M#liMri\ lj mOt
BrPay restitution in the amount of $
* or D in an amount to bexietermined bytne Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; EKat a rate of if\ fliA I bu Iq^t^^fO
; or • at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete any
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
• Probation and Parole; or D with
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
D Submit to drug testing.
O Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
STObtain and maintain full-time employment. 0^0 hOtVU)
A \DCCk*.
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant
to have no
contact
nor associate
Defendant'sisprobation
may
be transferred
to with
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
©'Defendant is to commit no crimes.
Defendant is
is ordered
ordered to
to appear
appear before
before this
this Court
Court on
on
for a
a review
review of
of this
this sentence.
sentence.
•D Defendant
— . . . tor

rxsGii*lo4^

frjrtPPn

-£»- Tfrun

rir/i/ngly>hr,rthu<A.

T-Tn/#te4 enter
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ADDENDUM B

1

probation to date.

2 I this.
3

Turn your life around.

Get serious about

It appears to the Court that that patience and long

suffering and that sage counsel and advice fell on deaf ears.

4

The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the

5

defendant has violated previously granted probation, in that

6

the defendant did not submit his monthly reports by the 5th of

7

the month, as agreed to by the defendant, as set forth in the

8

allegation No. 1 of the affidavit.

9

The Court finds that the State did not meet their

10

burden in allegation No. 2, regarding residence.

11

some confusion about whether or not the defendant lived there,

12

and whether or not that was a valid residence.

13

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the question of

14

residence was proved.

15

There is

The Court is

The Court finds that the State has proved beyond a

16

reasonable doubt allegation No. 3 in the affidavit, in that

17

the defendant violated previously granted probation by having

18

failed to maintain verifiable, lawful employment.

19

will take judicial notice that from South Temple to 5300 South

20

on State Street, on any given day, there are probably 15 or 20

21

help wanted signs posted in living color in the windows of

22

business establishments.

23

had, if a person is serious about being employed.

24

Compensation may not be more than minimum wage. Nevertheless,

25

it is there for a person serious about being employed.

This Court

Employment in this community can be

31

1 I

The Court finds that the State has proved beyond a

2

reasonable doubt allegation No. 4 in the affidavit, in that

3

the defendant failed to pay the minimum amount set by the

4

Court of $100 per month toward his fine.

There has not been

5 I one nickel paid on that fine in nine months.
6

Not a penny.

The Court further finds that the State has proved

7

beyond a reasonable doubt allegation No. 5 in the affidavit in

8

support of the order to show cause, in that the defendant

9

failed to make any child support payments toward what is now

10

in excess of $4,000 in child support arrearages.

11

child support is not of recent —

12

is not of recent origin.

13

refusal by the defendant to pay child support.

14

records verify that.

15

Payment of

nonpayment of child support

There is a longstanding, historical
And the

The Court finds that the defendant has violated

16

previously granted probation, granted to this defendant on the

17

6th of October, 1989.

18

is whether or not the defendant should be reinstated on the

19

original terms of probation, with additional terms of

20

probation added thereto, or whether or not the original prison

21

sentence handed down and stayed should be imposed.

22

will hear from counsel.

23

MR. SK0RDAS:

The sole question before the Court now

The Court

Since Mr. Bartell would be the person

24

supervising him, could I allow him to address the Court on

25

that?
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LISA J. REMAL, (#2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

DELL D. ARCHULETTA,

:

Defendant.

:

ORDER

Case No. 891901028FS
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN

After having heard the testimony of the witnesses presented
by the State and by the defendant, and having heard the arguments of
counsel,
The Court finds that the defendnat has violated his
probation as follows:
1.

The defendant failed to report to Adult Probation and

Parole in May, 1990, as alleged in allegation No. 1 of the Order to
Show Cause.
2.

The defendant failed to maintain verifiable, lawful

employment and/or education, as alleged in allegation No. 3 of the
Order to Show Cause.
3.

The defendant failed to pay $100 per month towards his

fine, as alleged in allegation No. 4 of the Order to Show Cause.

000Q95

4.

The defendant failed to pay a total of $300 per month

towards his child support obligation/ as alleged in allegation No. 5
of the Order to Show Cause.
Based upon those findings,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants probation be
revoked and reinstated on probation for eighteen (18) months after
his release from jail upon the following conditions:
1.

That all conditions of probation previously imposed be

in effect.
2.

That he serve six months in jail with credit for time

3.

That within fifteen calendar days from his release from

served.

jail, he be employed sixty hours per week, and that he provide
written verification of the same.
4.

That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon as

possible after his release from jail, but no later than ninety days
from that release; further that any costs he pays towards said
vocational training can be deducted from the fine previously
imposed.
DATED this jG

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

/

HONORABLE PAT ~&T-ttf

S/s<^* ^ W

Third D i s t r i c t Court
Approved,hi to form:
DAS
ounty Attorney
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